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I.  INTRODUCTION
One of the most perplexing questions in modern constitutional law is when, if 
ever, regulations of property that do not formally transfer title to the government result in
the property being “taken for public use, without just compensation” in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.1  In 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,2
*  The Animals , Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood, Animal Tracks (Columbia Records 1965).
**  Professor, Boston University School of Law.  J.D. 1983, Yale Law School.  I am grateful to the 
Abraham and Lillian Benton Fund for support.
2the Supreme Court set forth a framework for inquiry concerning such so-called regulatory 
takings that considers “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations . . . [and] the character of the governmental action.” 3  A year later, in 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,4 the Court recast this framework into a three-factor 
analysis that distinctly considers “the economic impact of the regulation, its interference 
      This article is the synthesis of three related projects: Professor Lawson’s long-standing musings, and 
recent research, about the origins and nature of the Penn Central and Mathews frameworks; a seminar paper 
written by Katie Ferguson comparing and contrasting the three-factor tests that have come to be associated 
with Penn Central and Mathews; and a seminar paper written by Guillermo Montero that sought to 
reformulate and defend the Penn Central framework against some of the most extreme criticisms that have 
been brought against it.  It is fair to say that Mr. Montero’s paper was the true genesis of  this enterprise.  
Although this article heads in very different directions than Mr. Montero envisioned, the article simply 
would not have existed but for his effort.
***  J.D. Candidate, Boston University School of Law.
****  Honors Attorney, United States Dep’t of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division.  J.D. 
2004, Boston University School of Law.  The views represented here are solely those of the authors, not of 
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1 U.S. Const. amend. V.  More precisely, the Fifth Amendment confirms and clarifies that the federal 
government may not take private property without just compensation.  The basic prohibition against 
uncompensated federal takings is actually found in the so-called Necessary and Proper Clause – or the 
Sweeping Clause, as it was known to the founding generation – which permits Congress to authorize 
takings of private property if, but only if, such action is “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 
federal powers.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  A taking without just compensation would not be “proper.”  The 
Sweeping Clause both authorizes and limits the exercise of a federal eminent domain power.  See Gary 
Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev.  1081, 
1086-87 (1999).  The Fifth Amendment amplifies and emphasizes these limits on federal takings but does 
not create them.
     For more than a century, of course, the federal courts have held that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes precisely the same limits on state takings of property as the Takings Clause and 
Sweeping Clause place on federal takings.  See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 
(1897).  In this article, we accept that conclusion without endorsing it.
2
   438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3 Id. at 138.
4
   44 U.S. 164 (1979).
3with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 
action.”5
Although the Penn Central formulation, as recast by Kaiser Aetna, has dominated 
discussion of takings law for a quarter of a century and continues to serve as the 
canonical standard for regulatory takings analysis,6 virtually everyone agrees that it 
serves its function badly. Some writers may applaud the general pattern of results that 
emerges from the Penn Central framework, but the framework itself is almost universally 
decried as hopelessly vague, impossible to apply in a consistent fashion, and an invitation 
to judicial subjectivity.7 This disdain for Penn Central unites the strangest of bedfellows: 
Gideon Kanner, a long-time champion of property rights, and John Echeverria, an equally 
dedicated champion of government regulation, have criticized the Penn Central
framework in strikingly similar terms.8  Professor Echeverria has forcefully concluded 
5 Id. at 175.
6 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
321 (2002); Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion with the Supreme Court Litigators, 15 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 287, 287 (2004) [hereinafter Looking Back] (comments of Richard Lazarus) 
(“Penn Central . . . has become the lodestar of the Court’s takings analysis.  As people have found in recent 
years, woe to the advocate who stands before the Court and tries to suggest a departure from the Penn 
Central test.”).
7
   For a compendium of jurisprudential criticisms of the Penn Central framework, see Mark R. Poirier, The 
Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 93, 97 n.2 (2002).  Penn Central’s few 
defenders praise this very vagueness as an appropriate judicial response to the competing human values at 
stake in regulatory takings cases.  See F. Patrick Hammond, Palazzolo, Lucas and Penn Central: The Need 
for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 465, 517-18 (2001), Poirier, supra, at 
100-02.
8 Compare Gideon Kanner, “Landmark Justice” or “Economic Lunacy”? A Quarter Century Retrospective 
on Penn Central, SJ052 ALI-ABA 379, 381 (2004) (decrying Penn Central’s “questionable provenance, 
destabilizing influence on the law, dubious status as precedent, and its substantive shortcomings”), with
John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor-Test Ready for History’s Dustbin?, 52 Land Use L. 
& Zoning Dig. 3, 11 (2000) (declaring that the Penn Central framework “is not supported by current 
Supreme Court precedent, invites unprincipled judicial decision making, conflicts with the language and 
original understanding of the takings clause, would confer unjust windfalls in many cases, and creates 
seemingly insurmountable problems in terms of definining an appropriate remedy”).
4that “[t]he time has come to deposit the three-factor test [from Penn Central] in history’s 
dustbin.”9
Two years before Penn Central, the Supreme Court decided another case 
involving a three-factor analysis that has generated similar, and similarly voluminous and 
vociferous, criticisms.  In 1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge,10 the Court set forth a three-
factor framework for analyzing the constitutional adequacy of procedures under the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.11  The due process inquiry, 
said the Court,
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements 
would entail.12
This three-factor framework dominates procedural due process law in much the same 
way as, and to much the same extent that, the Penn Central three-factor framework 
dominates the regulatory takings inquiry.  And the Mathews due process inquiry, like the 
Penn Central inquiry, is routinely assailed as unworkable, subjective, incomplete, and 
incapable of consistent application.13  History’s dustbin seems to beckon to Mathews as 
invitingly as it does to Penn Central.
9 Id.  See also Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Law Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 995, 995 (1997) (Penn Central is an “ill fitting piece[] left over from other puzzles long 
ago forgotten and now deserving abandonment”).
10
  424 U.S. 319 (1976).
11 U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV § 1.
12
   424 U.S. at 334-35.
13 See infra TAN --.
5We worry that the brooms may be coming out too quickly.  In our view, many of 
the criticisms levelled at both Penn Central and Mathews are misdirected because they
are based on profound misunderstandings of the purpose and scope of both opinions.  It is 
embarrassingly easy to demonstrate that the frameworks of Penn Central and Mathews
are dismal failures as tools for making or predicting judicial decisions.  Factors can only 
determine or predict outcomes if they are commensurable, and the simple fact that neither 
Penn Central nor Mathews provides (or could ever have provided) a reliable method for 
rendering commensurable and aggregating the various factors that they identify is enough 
to prove that those decisions cannot function well as decision-making mechanisms.  But 
that does not make the frameworks failures in all possible respects.  Frameworks can 
serve functions other than determining or predicting outcomes.
We do not believe that the Court in Penn Central and Mathews -- and in terms of 
personnel it was the same Court in both cases -- actually thought that it was providing a 
decision-making algorithm for either regulatory takings or due process problems.  Rather, 
we believe that each opinion had the more modest, but nonetheless important, ambition 
of providing a framework or structure for discussion of the issues arising in takings and 
due process law.
In both takings law and due process law, as the doctrine in each area currently 
stands, the ultimate touchstone for inquiry is that most indefinable and context-sensitive 
of concepts: “fairness.”  There is no algorithm for determining fairness in either context, 
and it makes no sense to look for one.  The most that one can do is to channel the fairness 
inquiry in a fashion that lends itself to the stylized arguments of an adversarial legal 
culture.  Put simply, one needs to tell lawyers how to write briefs and to tell judges how 
6to write opinions about “fair” treatment of property owners and “fair” procedures.  A 
properly constructed framework – whether consisting of two factors, three factors, or 
more – can in principle serve that modest but significant function even if it is useless as a 
tool for making or predicting ultimate decisions.
We are confident that the Penn Central and Mathews Court did not have any 
grander aspirations in mind for these frameworks than this conversation-shaping
function.  When viewed in that more limited fashion, both opinions make a good deal of 
doctrinal and jurisprudential sense.  Moreover, once the functions of the respective 
frameworks are understood, it is possible to think about refashioning those frameworks in 
a way that better achieves their goals. Accordingly, we come neither to bury the Penn 
Central and Mathews frameworks nor to praise them, but to clarify them so that they may 
better serve their true jurisprudential aims.
In Part II, we begin with an analyis of Mathews v. Eldridge.  We situate the 
Mathews due process framework within the larger context of procedural due process law 
and show that the Mathews Court never intended its formulation to do anything other 
than provide a structure for argument. Mathews purported only to explain some of the 
considerations that had gone into previous judicial determinations concerning procedural 
fairness and to tell lawyers and judges what kind of language to use when crafting 
arguments.  Indeed, the Mathews Court did not even invent the Mathews three-factor 
framework.  The framework was suggested by the Solicitor General’s brief in the case on 
behalf of Secretary Mathews and was directly endorsed by the amicus brief filed on 
behalf of Eldridge.  The Mathews framework was thus the creation of professional 
litigators who were simply trying to understand and express what the Court’s prior 
7decisions concerning fundamental procedural fairness required.  We do not deny that the 
Court’s formulation of these considerations in Mathews was in some respects 
infelicitious, nor do we deny that subsequent decisions, including subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions, have misapplied that framework by treating it as a decision-making 
device.  But that is not a problem inherent in the Mathews framework, which can easily 
be recast to avoid further misapplications.
In Part III, we use insights drawn from our analysis of Mathews to show that the 
Penn Central takings framework serves the same conversation-structuring function as 
does the Mathews inquiry.  Again, we do not deny that courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have often incorrectly treated the Penn Central framework as a decision-making 
device, but that is a misapplication of Penn Central rather than an inherent feature of the 
opinion’s framework.  We also note some intriguing similarities and differences between 
the Mathews and Penn Central frameworks that point the way to an appropriate 
reconstruction of each.
In Part IV, we propose a modest reformulation of the Penn Central framework as 
it is currently employed.  More precisely, we propose a restoration of the Penn Central
framework to the form in which it was originally constructed in 1978.  The framework 
that is now routinely attributed to Penn Central was not in fact the framework set forth in 
Penn Central.  The modern framework comes from Kaiser Aetna’s recasting of the Penn 
Central analysis, and we regard that recasting as a giant step backwards in clarity. By 
splitting off “investment-backed expectations” as an analytical element distinct from the 
impact of a regulation on the claimant, Kaiser Aetna set the law on a path of confusion 
from which it has not yet recovered.  To be sure, the opinion in Penn Central was written 
8under serious time pressure14 and therefore was not as crisp as it could have been about 
its aims and methods; it is no great surprise that Penn Central was subsequently 
misunderstood .  But a return to the Penn Central framework as it was initially crafted is 
doctrinally more sensible than current law. Part V contains brief concluding remarks.
One should be very clear about the scope of this project.  We emphatically do not
maintain in this article that either Penn Central or Mathews accurately reflects the 
original meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions or (to the extent that this is a 
separate inquiry) represents a normatively attractive resolution of the competing interests 
that operate in their respective domains.  We have nothing to say here about criticisms of 
either doctrine that come from those directions.  Our point is only that, given the basic 
contours of the modern doctrines governing regulatory takings and procedural due 
process, Penn Central and Mathews may deserve more respect than they usually get in 
the academy.  As a doctrinal and jurisprudential matter, they simply are not as bad as 
many people seem to think.
II.  REDISCOVERING MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
Mathews v. Eldridge dominates modern procedural due process law.  There are 
some instances in which due process cases are decided without reference to the Mathews
framework,15 but they are self-conscious exceptions to the general rule.  Along with 
14 See Looking Back, supra note XX, at 301-02.
15 See, e.g., Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002)
9Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,16 Mathews is arguably one of the two most 
important procedural due process cases of the modern era.
Mathews, of course, was decided 185 years after ratification of the Fifth 
Amendment. Whatever Mathews’ contribution to the law may have been, the country got 
along without that contribution for quite some time.  Thus, in order to understand 
Mathews’ proper place in the due process firmament, one must understand what 
happened during those 185 years before it was birthed – and in particular one must 
understand the unanswered questions about procedural due process law that faced the 
Supreme Court in 1976.
A. Some Procedural Fundamentals
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the 
federal and state governments, respectively, from depriving persons of life, liberty, or 
property “without due process of law.”  When governmental deprivations occur, exactly 
what process of law is due, and from whom?
The Due Process Clauses are paradigmatically checks on executive and judicial 
conduct, as befitting their origins in Article 39 of Magna Carta.17 The most important 
function of the Due Process Clauses is to codify the basic idea, known as the principle of 
legality, that executive and judicial deprivations are permissible only when authorized by 
16
   408 U.S. 564 (1972).
17
   Article 39, the forerunner of the Due Process Clauses, declared in 1215 that “[n]o free man shall be 
taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”  The King, in other words, could 
not act against freemen without prior legal authorization.
10
positive law.18  Legislatures are not a primary target of the principle of legality; indeed, it 
is legislative action that generally provides the necessary authorization for executive or
judicial deprivations.
But the Due Process Clauses also regulate the procedural forms by which 
deprivations take place, even when those forms are prescribed by legislation. In
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,19  the Supreme Court’s first
decision involving the procedural reach of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
the Court declared that “it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which 
might be devised.  The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive 
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress 
free to make any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.”20 Thus, if the legislature 
purported to authorize executive or judicial deprivations without, for example, notice to 
the affected party, the legislation would not insulate the deprivation from a due process 
challenge.
But when are procedures -- whether crafted by legislatures, executives, or courts –
less than what is due?  As the Court pointedly observed in Murray’s Lessee in 1856,
“[t]he constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to 
allow or forbid.  It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain 
whether it be due process.”21 Thus, said the Court, “we must look to those settled usages 
and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the 
18 See Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 631-32 (3d ed. 2004).
19
   59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
20 Id. at 277.
21 Id.
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emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil 
and political conditions by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this 
country.”22
Those “settled usages and modes of proceeding,” or traditions, afford some clear 
answers to some easy cases.  A criminal defendant can only be permanently deprived of 
life, liberty, or property after a full-dress trial, complete with a jury if the defendant so 
wishes.23  The jury trial, with a neutral judge as the arbiter,24 represents the highest form 
of procedural protection against governmental action recognized in the American legal 
system.  At the other extreme, deprivations effected by legislation require only the 
procedures specified by the Constitution for valid legislative action, such as bicameralism 
and presentment25 (or the equivalent formalities under any relevant state constitution);
they do not require prior notice, opportunities for hearings, or other procedural devices 
familiar from the judicial or executive context.  The process that is due for a deprivation 
depends to a considerable extent on the nature of the governmental body that is doing the 
depriving.
But reference to “settled usages and modes of proceeding” does not always 
provide an easy answer.  What happens, for instance, when deprivations take the form 
neither of validly-enacted legislation nor of formal judicial proceedings?  Many 
22 Id.
23 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 & amend. VI; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, -- U.S. --, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2661 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  For more than a century, this principle has not applied to so-called petty crimes, 
where the penalty involves fewer than six months imprisonment.  See Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and 
Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 1971-72 (2004); Jeff E. Butler, Note, Petty Offenses, 
Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses and the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 94 Mich. L. 
Rev. 872 (1995).
24 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
25 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
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deprivations occur through administrative actions, ranging from the arrest and detention 
of criminal suspects to the suspension of licenses to the seizure of property alleged to be 
contraband to the assessment of property values for taxation purposes.  If executive 
administrators step into the constitutional shoes of judges, they can only effect these 
deprivations through full-blown judicial trials.  If they step into the constitutional shoes 
of legislators, they can proceed with no procedural formality whatsoever.  If they step 
into the constitutional shoes of neither, then “settled usages and modes of proceeding” 
may be of little help in figuring out the requirements of due process. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court rejected both the 
judicial and the legislative analogies for administrative deprivations. Londoner v. 
Denver26 concerned a tax for local improvements assessed by the City of Denver against 
landowners who supposedly would benefit from the improvements.  Before the tax was 
finally assessed, the landowners were allowed to file written objections to the city 
council’s proposed allocation of the costs among the various landowners but had no 
opportunity to appear in person before the city council.27 Had the tax been imposed by 
the Colorado state legislature, there would have been no due process issue, as the Due 
Process Clauses impose no specific procedural requirements on legislatures.  The state 
legislature could have assessed the tax without notice -- and a fortiori without a hearing.28
26
   210 U.S. 373 (1908).
27 See id. at 380-81.  There were also a number of preliminary steps before the tax was assessed, 
including a resolution for the work proposed by the Board of Public Works and enactment of an ordinance 
authorizing the work.  No procedures were constitutionally necessary for these preliminary steps because 
none of them resulted in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.  They were essential parts of a process 
that would ultimately lead to a deprivation (the tax), but only the deprivation itself constitutionally required 
procedures.  See id. at 378-79.
28 See Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 709-10 (1884).
13
And had liability equivalent to the tax been the result of a judicial proceeding, the 
procedures afforded the landowners would obviously have been inadequate.
The Denver city council, however, was neither the state legislature nor a court; it 
was an administrative body exercising delegated authority from the state legislature.  The 
Supreme Court held that, at least when a relatively small number of persons are
affected,29 such an administrative body does not stand in the place of the legislature for 
due process purposes,30 nor does it have to provide all of the procedures required for 
lawful judicial action.31  Instead, said the Court, a litigant in the position of the 
landowners “shall have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief, 
and, if need be, by proof, however informal.”32 The plaintiffs in Londoner were not 
entitled to anything resembling a formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure 
Act,33 but they were entitled to at least to some kind of informal give-and-take, including 
an opportunity to address the city council in person.34
29
   Seven years after the decision in Londoner, the Court held that administrative bodies do in fact step into 
the constitutional shoes of the legislature when they act in a broad, rule-like fashion.  See Bi-Metallic 
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
30 See 210 U.S. at 385-86 (“But where the legislature of a State, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to 
some subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount, and upon whom it shall be levied, 
and of making its assessment and apportionment, due process of law requires that at some stage of the 
proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, 
of which he must have notice, either personal, by publication, or by a law fixing the time and place of the 
hearing.”).
31 See id. at 386 (“Many requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in 
proceedings of this nature.”).
32 Id.
33 See 5 U.S.C. § 556-57 (2000) (describing the trial-type procedures required for on-the-record federal 
administrative hearings).
34
  Nearly three-quarters of a century later, this kind of informal hearing with an opportunity for face-to-
face contact would come to be known as a “Goss hearing.”  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
14
Conspicuously absent from the opinion in Londoner was any explanation for why
that particular procedural package, among the myriad procedural sets that one can 
imagine, was legally required.  One can understand why the Court would not want to 
treat every administrative body as either a legislature or a court, which would set up a 
stark feast-or-famine dichotomy between no procedures and a full-dress trial,35 but one 
then has to specify where in the vast range between those two poles the procedures in any 
given case must fall.  Londoner simply announced its result without providing any 
principles or guidance for future determinations.
The late nineteenth-century cases that preceded Londoner had provided little more 
explanation for their decisions.  One of the Court’s earliest post-Murray’s Lessee
pronouncements on due process specifically declined to set forth any broad principles for 
determining adequate procedures in cases not clearly governed by tradition, on the 
ground that “there is wisdom, we think, in . . . the gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require . . . .”36  Shortly thereafter, 
the Court explained that “by ‘due process’ is meant one which, following the forms of 
law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected.”37 Evidently, the 
Court was simply feeling its way in each case to whatever procedures seemed, taking all 
things into account, fair under the circumstances.  Five years after Londoner, the Court 
35
   Modern administrative law does, at least formally, set up this kind of dichotomy through the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s stark distinction between formal and informal procedural modes.  See
Lawson, supra note XX, at 196-98.  Of course, the rise of hybrid rulemaking (and, to a lesser extent, hybrid 
adjudication) has narrowed somewhat the distance between formal and informal proceedings.  See id. at 
277.
36
   Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
37 Hagar, 111 U.S. at 708.
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expressly confirmed that the Due Process Clauses indeed forbid procedures that are 
“inadequate or manifestly unfair.”38
Subsequent twentieth-century decisions did not clarify the appropriate standard 
for procedural adequacy – and indeed strongly reinforced the idea that no such unitary 
standard is available because the touchstone of procedural adequacy is fairness to the 
affected parties, which necessarily requires a case-sensitive inquiry.  In Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,39 decided in 1951, a badly-splintered five-Justice 
majority that produced five separate opinions held that the United States Attorney 
General had not been given power by executive order to designate organizations as 
Communist without a hearing.  Justice Frankfurter penned a long, rambling, and 
ultimately very influential concurrence that discoursed at considerable length about 
procedural due process and the “deep-rooted demands of fair play”40 that it embodies but 
which ultimately said little of substance about the mechanism through which one ought to 
resolve procedural disputes.41 Justice Frankfurter, as with the Justices before him, 
38
   ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
39
   341 U.S. 123 (1951).
40 Id. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41 See, e.g., id. at 162-63 (citations omitted):
The requirement of "due process" is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be respected 
in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens. But "due process," 
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that 
feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo–American 
constitutional history and civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous 
limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and 
more particularly between the individual and government, "due process" is compounded of 
history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic 
faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a 
process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by 
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
16
strongly resisted any attempt to reduce constitutional procedural adequacy to any set 
formula or predetermined criteria other than basic fairness.
Ten years later, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO 
v. McElroy,42 the Court roundly declared that “[t]he very nature of due process negates 
any concept of inflexible procedures univerally applicable to every imaginable 
situation,”43 so that “consideration of what procedures due process may require under any 
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the 
government function involved as well as of the precise nature of the private interest that 
has been affected by the governmental action.”44 The case ultimately turned on whether 
the plaintiff had been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest at all, so there was 
no specific discussion of the particular procedures to which she might have been entitled.
In 1970, nearly a decade later, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly45 held for the first 
time that deprivation of certain governmental benefits – in this case a form of welfare 
. . . .
     It may fairly be said that, barring only occasional and temporary lapses, this Court has not 
sought unduly to confine those who have the responsibility of governing by giving the great 
concept of due process doctrinaire scope. The Court has responded to the infinite variety and 
perplexity of the tasks of government by recognizing that what is unfair in one situation may be 
fair in another. Whether the ex parte procedure to which the petitioners were subjected duly 
observed "the rudiments of fair play," Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 168, 
cannot, therefore, be tested by mere generalities or sentiments abstractly appealing. The precise 
nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the 
reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection 
implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt 
complained of and good accomplished — these are some of the considerations that must enter into 
the judicial judgment.
42
   367 U.S. 886 (1961).
43 Id. at  895.
44 Id.
45
   397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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benefits – had to be preceded by highly formalized procedures akin to a formal 
adjudication.46 The Court’s discussion ranged widely over the plaintiffs’ need for 
continuing receipt of benefits,47 the government’s concerns about policing fraud in the 
program,48 and the “capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,”49 but the 
opinion did not provide any general principles to guide the process of formulating 
adequate procedures.  Rather, Goldberg’s procedural mandate was tailored to the Court’s 
perception of the abilities, limitations, and conditions of the terminated recipients, and the 
Court explicitly noted that “[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be 
afforded the recipient . . . depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding . . . 
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.”50  As in Londoner
more than sixty years before, the Court announced a result without providing much 
insight into the process by which that result was reached.
Similar considerations were at work in 1972 in Morrissey v. Brewer.51  After 
holding that parole revocations effected a deprivation of “liberty” within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clauses,52 the Court set forth a detailed set of procedures that requires at 
least six elements for a constitutionally proper hearing.53  But, as in Goldberg v. Kelly,
46 See id. at 263-64.
47 See id. at 264.
48 See id. at 265-66.
49 Id. at 268-69.
50 Id. at 263.
51
   408 U.S. 471 (1972).
52 Id. at 481-82.
53 Id. at 489 (the minimum requirements of due process in this context “include (a) written notice of the 
claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be 
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although the Court’s discussion of the requirements of due process was quite lengthy,54
almost all of that discussion simply identified and described the particular procedures that 
were thought to be required in the case at hand.  There was nothing to suggest that any set 
of general principles or considerations controlled the analysis.
The law of procedural due process thus entered the last quarter of the twentieth 
century in much that same way that it had left the last quarter of the nineteenth: “by ‘due 
process’ is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and 
just to the parties to be affected.”55  The ultimate inquiry with respect to due process 
remained, as it had always been, a search for what procedures are fair under the 
circumstances of each particular case.
There are two very large potential problems with this legal formulation of the 
requirements of “due process of law”: a problem of substance and a problem of form.  
Substantively, by its nature a “fairness” test for procedural adequacy is difficult to apply 
and spawns uncertainty.  Small differences in facts, including differences in facts about 
the specific plaintiffs or defendants in particular cases, can make large differences in 
outcomes, so it is hard to project future decisions from past determinations.  There is no 
way to address this problem, however, without changing the basic terms of the 
substantive inquiry.  Once it is accepted that fairness determines procedural adequacy –
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of 
which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the 
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole”).
54 See id. at 483-90.
55 Hagar, 111 U.S. at 708.
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and the Court has been very consistent about that conclusion for a century and a half –
one simply has to live with a certain degree of unpredictability in those determinations.
The formal problem is more pertinent to our story.  Assume that everyone 
understands and accepts that the constitutional due process inquiry focuses on fairness to 
the parties under the circumstances of each case.  Everyone accordingly understands and 
accepts that application of this principle will be difficult and unpredictable.  People still 
need to be able to formulate arguments.  Lawyers have to be able to construct arguments 
about procedural fairness within the conventions of the adversarial legal system, and 
judges (and adminstrators) must be able to write opinions about due process problems 
that conform to professional norms.  Even if the ultimate inquiry in the case involves 
nothing more substantial than an ultimately subjective, all-things-considered judgment 
about fairness, the expectations of the legal culture require that advocates and 
decisionmakers be able to express that judgment in some objectified manner.  Due 
process law requires a common language by which legal actors can talk to each other 
about fairness.
That is where Mathews v. Eldridge entered the scene.
B. The Lingua Franca of Procedural Law
George Eldridge was awarded Social Security disability benefits by a hearing 
examiner in Virginia on June 8, 1968.56  Nearly four years later, the state agency that 
56
   The District Court opinion stated that benefits were awarded on June 2, 1968; Eldridge’s counsel 
alleged that the benefits were awarded on June 8, 1968.  The Supreme Court deftly avoided the controversy 
over the correct date.  See 424 U.S. at 323 (“Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 
1968”).  We assume (for no reason that we can defend) that Eldridge’s counsel was correct.
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administered the Social Security disability program in Virginia determined that Eldridge 
had medically improved, was able to work, and was no longer entitled to disability 
benefits.  The federal Bureau of Disability Insurance of the Social Security 
Administration approved the state decision, and Eldridge’s benefits ceased after July 
1972.
The state review process involved notice to Eldridge, receipt and review of 
evidence of Eldridge’s medical condition, and several opportunities for Eldridge to 
provide written material that he considered relevant to his case.57  Eldridge challenged the 
constitutional adequacy of these procedures on the ground that, as with the plaintiffs in 
Goldberg v. Kelly, he should have been granted a full evidentiary hearing, complete with 
oral participation and cross-examination of witnesses, prior to the termination of his 
benefits.58  The United States countered that Social Security disability benefits were 
different enough from benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program (and the Old Age Assistance program at issue in a companion case to 
Goldberg59) to require different procedures for termination.  In the District Court, the 
government asserted three basic differences between Eldridge’s situation and the 
situation of the plaintiffs in Goldberg: AFDC benefits are based on need while Social 
Security disability benefits are not, so that deprivation of the latter is less serious than 
57 See id. at 324.
58
   Everyone agreed that Eldridge’s benefits constituted “property” protected by the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.  See id. at 332.
59 See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
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deprivation of the former60; Social Security disability benefits decisions are based on 
objective medical evidence rather than the “ rumor and gossip’ ” that might form the 
basis for an adverse AFDC decision, so that oral hearings were therefore less useful in 
disability benefits cases61; and the massive Social Security disability system would be 
seriously disrupted if pre-termination hearings were generally required.62
The District Court responded in detail to each of the government’s proffered 
distinctions,63 rejected all of them, and held that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing 
was constitutionally required.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief 
order that simply adopted the reasoning of the District Court.64  The United States sought 
certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
The Solicitor General’s merits brief in the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
ultimate due process inquiry focused on fairness: “The procedures for terminating Social 
Security disability benefits provide an adequate and fair opportunity for a beneficiary to 
submit all relevant information necessary to enable the Social Security Administration to 
make an informed and reliable judgment whether the disability has ceased . . . .  The 
60
   361 F. Supp. at 523 (“It is argued that in the case of welfare recipients ‘need’ was the legal criterion for 
benefits . . . .  By contrast, according to the Secretary, the legal criterion for Title II disability benefits is 
whether the beneficiary continues to be ‘unable to engage in substantial gainful activity,’ which obtains 
irrespective of need.”).
61 Id. at 524 (“Defendant next argues that the nature of the evidence involved in the case of a disability 
recipient (‘medical reports of highly probative value’) justifies a different due process standard than in the 
case of welfare recipients where ‘rumor and gossip’ are more likely to form the basis of an adverse 
decision.”).
62 Id. at 525 (“The Secretary’s final argument in support of his position that a pre-termination hearing 
should not be required for disability recipients is that to require such hearings would result in vast 
disruption of the Social Security System.”).
63 See id. at 523-27.
64
   493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1975).
22
procedures by which disability benefits are now terminated are fair and they work.”65
The government also acknowledged the flexible and multifaceted character of the basic 
fairness inquiry.66  But in order to structure the inquiry for purposes of legal 
argumentation, the government offered the following observation:
The Court has identified three general interests that must be assessed in
determining the constitutional sufficiency of procedures for denying or 
terminating constitutionally-protected interests. They are: first, the nature of the 
property (or liberty) interest of which a person is assertedly being deprived (cf., 
e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, No. 73-679, decided June 26, 1974, slip op. 19); 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used (e.g., Goss v. Lopez, supra, slip op. at 14-16); and third, the 
administrative burdens and costs that particular procedural requirements would 
entail.  Id. at 17.67
The bulk of the government’s argument elaborated upon the application of the specific 
interests identified in this passage to Eldridge’s circumstances.
Five features of the government’s proposed formulation of the due process 
inquiry are noteworthy.  First, the above-quoted paragraph from the government’s brief is 
the obvious source of the three-factor framework adopted by the Court in the Mathews
opinion.  The Supreme Court quite clearly did not invent the Mathews v. Eldridge three-
factor analysis.  The analysis was invented by attorneys in the Solicitor General’s office 
and was then taken up by the Court.
Second, the government’s brief gives every indication that it is simply trying to 
describe, in lawyerly language, the considerations that the Court’s prior opinions had 
identified as relevant for assessing the ultimate fairness of procedures in a given context.  
65
   Brief for United States, Mathews v. Eldridge, No. 74-204, at 34-35.
66 Id. at 35 (citing, inter alia, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. at 895).
67 Id. at 35-36.
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Each of the factors is traced to a prior Court decision, and the more elaborate discussion 
that follows in the brief further tracks each factor through antecedent decisions.68
Third, the amicus brief of the AFL-CIO filed on behalf of Eldridge agreed entirely 
with the Solicitor General’s account of the proper structure for due process inquiry:69
The Secretary states that the interests to be assessed in determining when 
an evidentiary prior hearing is constitutionally required are: "First, the nature of 
the property . . . interest of which a person is assertedly being deprived . . . ; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used . . . ; and third, the administrative burdens and costs that 
particular procedural requirement would entail." (Sec. Br. p. 36.)
 We agree. For, these are the very factors upon which the Goldberg Court 
predicated its conclusion that an evidentiary prior hearing is the pre-condition for 
a cut-off of welfare . . . .
 Thus the governing principles are well settled. The crux of the 
controversy here is whether the Secretary's soothing assurances that the 
"procedures now followed in terminating Social Security disability benefits are 
fair, and [[that] they work" (Sec. Br. p. 55), prove out, or whether his arguments 
are nothing more than a carefully contrived illusion designed to create the 
appearance of a system that comports with the Constitution.70
No one in Mathews argued that the Solicitor General had somehow misrepresented the 
applicable law or omitted any crucial factors from the analysis.
Fourth, the three factors identified as relevant by the Solicitor General tracked 
precisely the three considerations that the government believed supported its case in 
Mathews.  As was made clear by the District Court opinion in Mathews, the government 
68 See id. at 37-38 (describing cases that treated the importance of the private interest as relevant to the 
scope of required procedures); id. at 39-40 (describing cases that treated the risk of error as relevant to the 
scope of required procedures); id. at 45-46 (describing cases that treated the consequences of procedural 
formality as relevant to the scope of required procedures).
69
   The merits brief filed directly on behalf of Eldridge did not really have much of interest to say about the 
appropriate due process inquiry, either in general or in Eldridge’s specific case.  The brief was very short, 
poorly organized, and soft on substance.  The AFL-CIO’s brief was considerably more sophisticated, which 
is unsurprising considering the organization’s repeat-player status in the Court.
70
   Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amici Curiae, 
Mathews v. Eldridge, No. 74-204, at 5-6.
24
sought to distinguish Eldridge’s situation from that of the plaintiffs in Goldberg on the 
basis of the alleged lower value of the private interest at stake, the character of the 
evidence at issue in Mathews, and the disruption to the massive Social Security disability 
program that would result from excessive proceduralization.  The government’s 
articulation of the considerations relevant to the due process analysis in its brief in 
Mathews was clearly dictated by the government’s specific litigating interest in that case.
Put as simply as possible: the Solicitor General in Mathews was not trying to shape, or 
re-shape, due process law.  He71 was trying to win a case.
Fifth, the government identified “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used” as the principle value of procedures because it 
thought that it could establish that oral hearings would contribute little to the accuracy of 
Social Security disability determinations, given the character of the evidence that is 
normally at issue in such cases.  Put simply, the government emphasized decisional 
accuracy because it was confident that focus on decisional accuracy would lead to a 
favorable result on the specific facts of Mathews.  As a more general proposition, 
reducing substantive error is obviously one important function, and perhaps even the 
primary function, of procedures.  Whether it is the sole function of procedures probably is 
not something to which the Solicitor General’s office devoted much thought. 
The Supreme Court in Mathews adopted the government’s argument almost in 
toto, both with respect to the appropriate framework for analysis and with respect to the 
particularized assessment of the factors in Eldridge’s case.  The crucial passage in which 
the Court accepted the government’s three-factor framework reads in relevant part:
71
   The Solicitor General at that time was Robert Bork, so the pronoun “he” is descriptive, not generic.
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In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the 
extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the 
deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a hearing is provided 
thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, has the Court held that a hearing 
closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some 
type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the Court has 
spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures . . . .
These decisions underscore the truism that " '[d]ue process,' unlike some 
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961). "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures 
provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental 
and private interests that are affected. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate 
that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.72
There is nothing in this passage that suggests that the Court had ambitions beyond those 
of the Solicitor General or the AFL-CIO.  The parties were simply trying to find some 
framework with which to structure their arguments about the basic fairness of the 
procedures employed by the government.  The Court accepted as settled law that basic 
fairness is the ultimate inquiry, that due process requires a particularized, case-specific 
inquiry into fairness, that private and public interests must be considered, and that past 
decisions establish that the three factors identified by the government “generally” are 
important to the ultimate inquiry.  None of this should be remotely controversial.  None 
of this suggests that the three articulated factors, which just happened to be the factors 
thought by the government to be most relevant to the disposition of Eldridge’s case, are 
72
   424 U.S. at 333-35.
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the only factors relevant to the basic fairness inquiry.  None of this suggests that the 
three-part framework somehow displaces the ultimate inquiry into fairness rather than 
simply structuring that inquiry into language that lawyers and decisionmakers can 
employ.
If the Mathews decision accomplishes anything other than disposing of Eldridge’s 
case on its facts, it merely sets out a framework in which legal actors can speak to each 
other about fairness.  The language setting forth that framework is not meant to be 
exclusive; it is meant to be facilitative of clear analysis in a large run of cases.  Properly 
employed, the Mathews factors can effectively serve that function of letting people talk 
about fairness in terms that lend themselves to adversarial legal argumentation, as all of 
the factors identified in Mathews are at least potentially relevant to an assessment of fair 
procedures.  Anyone who tries to do more with the Mathews framework  simply does not 
understand its origins or limitations.
C. Misunderstanding Mathews
Early Supreme Court decisions after Mathews (properly) identified the three-
factor framework as merely a useful tool of analysis.73  It did not take long, however,
before the Court began describing, and using, the Mathews framework as a “test” – that 
is, as a tool for reaching decisions rather than simply for expressing in legal language the 
rationale for decisions reached through an assessment of basic fairness.  By 1979, for 
73 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977); 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977); Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
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example, the Court could say that “[t]he parties agree that our prior holdings have set out 
a general approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim.”74
By 1981, the transformation of the Mathews formulation from a framework for 
discussion into a decision-making algorithm was complete.  In a case involving the right 
to appointed counsel in a civil case, the Court explained: “The case of Mathews v. 
Eldridge propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process requires 
. . . .  We must balance these elements against each other, and then set their net weight in 
the scales against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where 
the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.”75
Modern cases continue to treat the Mathews three-factor formulation as a 
decision-making test,76 as exemplified by the 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,77 in 
which the Court held that an American citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given 
“a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker”78:
The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing 
interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a 
citizen is not “deprived of life, liberty, or property, withouth due process of law,” 
is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.  Mathews dictates that the 
process due in any given instance is determined by weighing “the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action” against the Government’s asserted 
interest, “including the function involved” and the burdens the Government would 
face in providing greater process.  The Mathews calculus then contemplates a 
judicious balancing of those concerns, through an analyhsis of “the risk of an 
74
   Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979) (emphasis added).
75
   Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
76 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716-17 (2003).
77
-- U.S. --, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
78 Id. at 2648.
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erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if the process were reduced and the 
“probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards.”79
Modern scholars likewise generally treat the Mathews framework as though it were an 
outcome-determinative test.80  The Court also seems to have accepted the idea that the 
sole justification for procedures is “to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions,”81
although there have been occasional dissenting voices on that score.82
Critics have, with considerable justification, roundly attacked the Mathews
framework’s efficacy as a decisionmaking tool.  Some have pointed out that one can only 
weigh factors against each other if the factors are commensurable,83 which the Mathews
factors do not appear to be.  As one critic has stated, “[t]his reliance upon ‘weight,’ which 
is a useful approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where 
factors such as those in Mathews are concerned.”84  Others have criticized the narrow
focus on decisional accuracy that the Mathews framework seems to require.  Jerry 
Mashaw has famously argued that by identifying decisional accuracy as the holy grail of 
79 Id. at 2646 (emphasis added).
80 See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 39, 47 n.37 (2003); Charles 
H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 635, 641-42 (2000); 
Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: 
Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917, 950-51 (1995); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Procedural Justice, 78 So. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 253 (2004).
81
   Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also Greenholz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied 
in the Constitution . . . , is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions”).
82 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Greenholz, 442 U.S. at 34 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting in part) (“Finally, apart from avoiding the risk of actual error, this Court has stressed the 
importance of adopting procedures that preserve the appearance of fairness”).
83
   For general discussions of problems of commensurability in the law, see Matthew Adler, 
Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1371 (1998); Gary Lawson, Efficiency 
and Individualism, 42 Duke L.J. 53 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 
92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994).
84
   Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1044 (1984).
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due process law, the Mathews formulation disregards the important value that individuals 
place on being heard: “a lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that 
dignity and self-respect that society properly deems independently valuable.”85  Others 
have similarly criticized the Mathews framework as too narrowly focused on accuracy at 
the expense of other potential values.86
All of these criticisms of Mathews have merit, but none of the developments in 
the evolution of Mathews that spawned these criticisms was inevitable.  Mathews does 
not have to be viewed as anything other than a potentially useful way of structuring 
dialogue about fairness, in which case criticisms of Mathews for failing to direct or 
predict decisions are misplaced.  Nor must Mathews be construed to constrict the 
perceived value of procedures solely to their ability to reduce the risk of erroneous 
substantive decisions.  One could, of course, independently reach the conclusion that 
procedures are only valuable for their role in reaching correct substantive outcomes, but 
nothing in Mathews compels that result.  If Mathews is best viewed solely as a means for 
starting (not finishing) a stylized legal conversation about fairness, it should be judged on 
those terms.
Does the Mathews formulation do a serviceable job of providing a common frame 
of reference for legal argumentation?  We think that it does.  It would fail in that task if 
the factors that it identified were wildly inappropriate to the ultimate inquiry, which they 
clearly are not.  It would also fail in that task if the factors themselves were so vague that 
85
   Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 50 (1976-77).
86 See, e.g., Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 189 (1991); Koch, supra
note XX; Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 44 (1992); James G. Wilson, 
Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 773, 801 
(1995).
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they could not serve as a tool for communication.  We do not see that problem either.  
Mathews has many critics, but we do not see the critics complaining that they do not 
know what the Mathews factors mean.  Quite to the contrary, the critics know exactly 
what the Mathews factors are getting at and don’t like it one bit.  Mathews is a perfectly 
respectable jurisprudential and doctrinal vehicle for promoting adversarial dialogue about 
fairness.
The process by which Mathews was transformed from a device for facilitating 
discussion into an outcome-determinative test is to some extent understandable –
formulations tend to take on lives of their own independently of their terms or 
justifications – but it is also regrettable.  A great deal of scholarly and judicial time and 
energy has been spent on problems that need never have arisen.  Nonetheless, the process 
has valuable lessons for understanding what has happened with the law of regulatory 
takings, to which we now turn.
III.  REDISCOVERING PENN CENTRAL
The development of the law of regulatory takings has some remarkable parallels 
to the development of the law of procedural due process.  Both bodies of law are oriented 
around a search for fair treatment.  Both require some kind of language in which lawyers 
and judges can construct arguments about fairness in legalistic fashion.  And both have 
generated three-factor frameworks that have evolved well beyond their original functions 
and justifications.  In this section, we trace the evolution of the law of regulatory takings 
and relate it to our prior discussion of due process law.  In the next section, we try to 
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reconstruct regulatory takings law in order better to serve its present doctrinal function.
A. Some Takings Fundamentals
The Fifth Amendment contains the injunction, “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”87  The Fourteenth Amendment has long been 
construed to contain a similar injunction.88 Perhaps the most devilish problem arising 
under the Takings Clause has been determining when property has been “taken” in the 
constitutional sense.89 If the government formally takes title to property through an 
official exercise of the eminent domain power, that is unquestionably a taking of property 
within the meaning of the Constitution.  But what if the government occupies property 
without formally taking title?  What if the government effectively destroys property and 
thus prevents the nominal owner from occupying it?  What if the government authorizes 
someone other than the nominal owner to occupy property?  What if the government 
controls the use of property rather than its occupancy?  In sum, when, if ever, do 
government regulations that do not formally transfer title ever rise to the level of 
constitutional takings?
87 U.S. Const. amend. V.
88 See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
89
   There are also serious issues about the meaning of “property” for purposes of the Takings Clause, see, 
e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1549 (2003) 
(describing a broad conception of protected property); Molly McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern 
Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605 (1996) (describing a 
narrow conception of protected property), about the requirement that takings occur only for a “public use,” 
[describe Sup. Ct. cases as soon as they are decided]; James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 
2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 859, and about the meaning of “just compensation,” [Serkin article forthcoming in 
Nw. U.L. Rev.].  But we are concerned here solely with the problem of determining when property has 
been “taken” by governmental action.
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From the nineteenth century onward, courts have consistently assumed that some 
governmental actions other than formal transfers of title can amount to takings of 
property,90 though fixing the contours of that doctrine has proven to be quite challenging.
A good harbinger of modern problems arose in 1871 in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.91
The defendant constructed a dam that effectively flooded a portion of the plaintiff’s land, 
so that “it worked an almost complete destruction of the value of the land.”92  The 
defendant claimed that the dam was authorized by the State of Wisconsin pursuant to its 
power to improve navigation on local rivers.  The statute authorizing construction of the 
dam made no provision for compensation to injured landowners.  The question was 
whether the provision in the Wisconsin constitution providing that “the property of no 
person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor” nonetheless 
required compensation to the plaintiff.
Formal title to the property was never transferred to the defendant or to the State 
of Wisconsin.  The flooding left the plaintiff in technical possession of the property but 
destroyed any ability of the plaintiff to use the land productively.  The defendant’s 
argument was “that there is no taking of the land within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision, and that the damage is a consequential result of such use of a navigable stream 
as the government had a right to for the improvement of its navigation.”93  If a taking of 
property occurs only when title is formally transferred, the defendant was right.
90 See Claeys, supra note XX; Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record 
Straight, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 1211.
91
   80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
92 Id. at 177.
93 Id. at 177.
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The Court held that the effective destruction of the ability to use the land 
constituted a taking, though its reasoning was brief and conclusory:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a 
provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for 
protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the government 
. . . , it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion 
of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can 
inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to 
total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest 
sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.94
But once the word “taken” is understood to extend beyond actions that transfer title, the 
question becomes how far it extends.  Does it extend only to extreme cases of total 
destruction of use and value, as in Pumpelly?  Does it extend to every governmental 
action that reduces the value of someone’s property?  Is there some identifiable point in 
between these extremes at which destruction or regulation crosses over into a 
constructive taking of property?  The Pumpelly Court fully recognized the nature of the 
problem that its holding generated:
We are not unaware of the numerous cases in the State courts in which the 
doctrine has been successfully invoked that for a consequential injury to the 
property of the individual arising from the prosecution of improvements of roads, 
streets, rivers, and other highways, for the public good, there is no redress; and we 
do not deny that the principle is a sound one, in its proper application, to many 
injuries to property so originating.   And when, in the exercise of our duties here, 
we shall be called upon to construe other State constitutions, we shall not be 
unmindful of the weight due to the decisions of the courts of those States.  But we 
are of opinion that the decisions referred to have gone to the uttermost limit of 
sound judicial construction in favor of this principle, and, in some cases, beyond 
it, and that it remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any 
artificial structure place on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, 
it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution, and that this proposition is 
not in conflict with the weight of judicial authority in this country, and certainly 
not with sound principle.  Beyond this we do not go, and this case calls us to go 
94 Id. at 177-78.
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no further.95
And with that acknowledgment, modern law was set on a course from which it has not 
yet wavered.  Once the word “taken,” whether in the Fifth Amendment or the Wisconsin 
state constitution (and the Court in Pumpelly clearly viewed those provisions as 
equivalent96), is held to include actions other than title transfers,97 there needs to be some 
mechanism for determining when those actions cross the line from incidental 
consequences of lawful government action to effective takings of property requiring 
compensation.
The Court most famously addressed this question in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon.98 The plaintiff coal company in 1878 had conveyed away the surface 
rights to some of its coal-mining lands but had expressly reserved the right to mine 
without regard to any damage to the surface.  The Pennsylvania legislature in 1921, 
however, prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in a manner (with some exceptions) 
that would cause subsidence of a human habitation.  The statute was challenged as an 
unconstitutional taking of the coal company’s property,99 though there was obviously no 
95 Id. at 180-81.
96 See id. at 176-77.
97
   Cases subsequent to Pumpelly made it very clear that title transfer was not essential to a taking.  The 
Court extended Pumpelly’s holding concerning the flooding of lands to federal action, see United States v. 
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (“While the government does not directly proceed to appropriate the title, 
yet it takes away the use and value; what that is done, it is of little consequence in whom the fee may be 
vested”), and further extended it to circumstances in which the flooding merely reduced by half the value of 
the land but did not destroy it entirely.  See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917).  Later 
decisions swept in use regulations as well.  See Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 
(1931) (“Confiscation may result from a taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well 
as from the taking of the title.”).
98
   260 U.S. 393 (1922).
99
   To be precise, the statute was challenged as a violation of the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, 
cl. 1, and the Due Process Clause.  It had already been established by 1922, however, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause effectively “incorporated” the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
35
formal transfer of title of any property to the state or any other individual.
The Court held the statute unconstitutional, concluding that “[t]he general rule at 
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking.”100  As in Pumpelly, the reasoning was vague and 
somewhat conclusory.  “Government could hardly go on,” wrote the Court, “if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law.”101 Though not every loss in value or use rights attributable to 
governmental action is a taking, the Court recogized that the principle that property can 
be harmed without compensation “must have its limits.”102
In defining those limits, the Court considered a number of factors.  The Court 
stated that “[o]ne fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the 
diminution.  When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be 
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.  So the question 
depends upon the particular facts.”103  The Court at several points suggested that the 
extent of the public interest was relevant,104 though it suggested elsewhere that even a 
strong public interest would not obviate the need for compensation.105  A previous 
decision had approved a requirement that pillars of coal be left in the ground as 
100
   260 U.S. at 415.
101
   260 U.S. at 413.
102 Id.
103 Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 413-14, 415.
105 Id. at 415-16.
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support106; that decision was distinguished because it involved “a requirement for the 
safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of 
advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws.”107 In the end, the 
Court concluded that the inquiry is inescapably “a question of degree – and therefore 
cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”108
The Court’s early efforts to define the contours of takings doctrine look very 
much like the Court’s early efforts to define what process is due.  The Court was unable 
to identify a generally controlling set of principles.  Rather, in each particular case, using 
all-things-considered reasoning, the Court appeared to be seeking the just or fair result.
This was confirmed in Armstrong v. United States.109  Armstrong had provided 
materials to a shipbuilder who was constructing vessels for the United States, which 
resulted in a materialmen’s lien for Armstrong under Maine law.  The shipbuilder 
defaulted on its contracts with the United States, and the government subsequently took 
title to the uncompleted ships.  Armstrong’s materialmen’s lien could not be enforced 
against the United States because of sovereign immunity.  Armstrong accordingly 
claimed that its lien had been “taken” because its value had been destroyed.  The 
Supreme Court agreed.  After finding that Armstrong’s lien was a valid property interest 
because it had been created before the government held title to the vessels,110 the Court 
held that destruction of the liens was a taking.  The Court acknowledged, as it had in 
106 See Plymouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
107
   260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
108 Id. at 415-16.
109
   364 U.S. 40 (1960).
110 See id. at 44-46.
37
prior decisions, “the difficulty of trying to draw the line between what destructions of 
property by lawful governmental actions are compensable ‘takings’ and what destructions 
are ‘consequential’ and therefore not compensable.”111  As it had in Pumpelly and 
Mahon, the Court announced its result in conclusory fashion:
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which 
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth 
Amendment “taking” and is not a mere “consequential incidence” of a valid 
regulatory measure.  Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly 
had compensable property.  Immediately afterwards, they had none.  This was 
not because their property vanished into thin air.  It was because the Government 
for its own advantage destroyed the value of the liens, something that the 
Government could do because its property was not subject to suit, but which no 
private purchaser could have done.  Since this acquisition was for a public use, 
however accomplished, whether with an intent and purpose of extinguishing the 
liens or not, the Government's action did destroy them and in the circumstances of 
this case did thereby take the property value of those liens within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment.  Neither the boats’ immunity, after being acquired by the 
Government, from enforcement of the liens nor the use of a contract to take title 
relieves the Government from its constitutional obligation to pay just 
compensation for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and of which loss the 
Government was the direct, positive beneficiary.112
The Court concluded with the oft-quoted observation that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”113
The emphasis on “fairness and justice” reflects the approach taken in Pumpelly
and Mahon.  It also parallels the approach taken by the Court with respect to 
111 Id. at 48.
112 Id. at 48-49.
113 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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constitutionally required procedures under the Due Process Clauses.  The due process 
inquiry, as we saw, is a search for fundamental fairness, with the Court unable because of 
the nature of the inquiry to formulate clear rules for general guidance in future cases.  
The Court’s early efforts to define regulatory takings (that is, takings that do not transfer 
title to property) follow the same pattern: the Court was searching for fair results and was 
unable to identify general principles that would guide that inquiry in future cases.  And as 
with the the law of procedural due process, lawyers and decisionmakers considering 
regulatory takings problems need to have a common language with which they can 
construct legal arguments about the underlying inquiry.
That is where Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City entered the 
scene.
B. The Lingua Franca of Takings Law
In 1968, Penn Central was on the verge of bankruptcy.  It owned Grand Central 
Terminal in New York City and entered into a long-term lease agreement that involved 
the construction of 55 stories of office space above the Terminal.  The previous year, 
however, the Terminal had been declared a landmark under a New York City ordinance, 
which meant that new construction above the Terminal required approval by the City’s 
Landmark Commission.  The Commission refused to approve the plan (and gave every 
indication that it would refuse to approve just about any plan), and Penn Central asserted 
that the City had therefore taken the air space above its Terminal without just 
compensation.
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Penn Central won on its takings claim in the New York trial court but lost in the 
intermediate Appellate Division and, ultimately, in the New York Court of Appeals.  In 
the Supreme Court, the brief for the appellee Landmark Commission contained the 
following observation:
Where the land use regulation is within the police power, the validity of 
the regulation will depend on an examination and balancing of three elements: the 
importance of the regulation to the public good, the reasonableness with which 
the regulation attempts to achieve that good and whether the restriction on the 
parcel renders it economically unviable.114
The brief traced this three-factor framework to a prior decision.115
The argument for appellant Penn Central did not directly challenge this 
framework but instead concentrated its fire on the New York Court of Appeals’ decision, 
which had relied on a novel theory that no one defended in the Supreme Court.116  Penn 
Central treated the ultimate issue as a straightforward syllogism: air rights are property; 
New York deprived Penn Central of the use of its air rights; therefore, New York took 
Penn Central’s property.
The Supreme Court upheld the City’s landmark ordinance, in an opinion that 
shares many features with the opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge.  As in Mathews, the Court 
began by observing that the “[t]he question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty”117 and that 
114
   Brief for Appellee City of New York Landmark Commission, Penn Central, No. 77-444, at 16.
115 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962).
116
   The New York Court of Appeals disallowed compensation for any component of property value that 
was attributable in some fashion to social factors rather than to individual investment.  See Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 331-33, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d 
914, 918-19 (1977).
117
   438 U.S. at 123.
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the ultimate inquiry focuses on fairness and justice to the parties.118  The Court frankly 
acknowledged that it had thus far “been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons”119 and that the outcome in a takings case “depends largely 
‘upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’ ”120
As in Mathews, the Court in Penn Central then identified “several factors that 
have particular significance”121 for making “these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”122
concerning basic fairness.  The Court explained:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character of 
the governmental action.  A “taking” may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government use than when interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.123
The Court then devoted fourteen pages of the United States Reports to a detailed 
description and rejection of Penn Central’s arguments.124  The Court’s discussion ranged 
widely over past precedents, the proper characterization of the property interest at stake, 
the role of expectations and diminishment of value in takings analysis, and the 
118 See id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States).
119 Id. at 124.
120 Id. (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citations omitted).
124 See id. at 124-37.
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particularized effect of New York’s landmark law on Penn Central’s property.  But the 
opinion did not give any indication that it viewed the paragraph quoted above as a test, 
much less an outcome-determinative test, for assessing regulatory takings.  The structure 
of the Court’s argument did not follow the analysis set forth in the quoted paragraph, nor 
did the Court specifically relate its subsequent detailed discussion to the factors 
mentioned in the paragraph.  More pointedly, to the extent that the Court in Penn Central
identified discrete factors for consideration, it identified two, rather than three, such 
factors: (1) the impact of the challenged regulation on the claimant, viewed in light of the 
claimant’s investment-backed expectations and (2) the character of the governmental 
action, viewed in light of the principle that actions that closely resemble direct exercises 
of eminent domain are more likely to be compensable takings than are garden-variety 
land-use regulations.  Someone who knew nothing of modern takings law would be, to 
say the least, hard-pressed to distill a discrete three-factor analysis from the opinion in 
Penn Central.
In sum, the reference in Penn Central to various factors appears to be nothing 
more than the Court’s application of the analysis outlined in the appellee’s brief – just as 
there was nothing in Mathews to suggest that the Court was doing anything other than 
incorporating the analysis of the government litigators into its opinion.  There is no 
reason to think that the Court itself viewed Penn Central as a major analytic turning point 
in takings law.125  Nor is there any reason to think that the Court in Penn Central thought 
that it was crafting a framework with three distinct factors.  Two, perhaps, but certainly
not three.
125
   The law clerks and lawyers who worked on the case confirm this impression.  See Looking Back, supra
note XX, at 305-06.
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C.  Misunderstanding Penn Central
As with Mathews, the Court’s subsequent decisions did not immediately treat 
Penn Central as having set forth an outcome-determinative test for regulatory takings 
cases.   In 1979 in Andrus v. Allard,126 the Court’s first major takings decision following 
Penn Central, the Court did not treat Penn Central as having set forth any kind of 
controlling analysis.127  Later that term, the Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States128
repeated much of the discussion from Penn Central but distilled it into the now-familiar 
three-factor analysis that encompasses “the economic impact of the regulation, its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action.”129  Thus, it was Kaiser Aetna that first split the economic impact 
on the claimant apart from the claimant’s investment-backed expectations, combined 
126
   444 U.S. 51 (1979).
127 See id. at 65:
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123- 128 (1978), is our 
most recent exposition on the Takings Clause.  That exposition need not be repeated at length 
here.  Suffice it to say that government regulation – by definition – involves the adjustment of 
rights for the public good.  Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic 
exploitation of private property.  To require compensation in all such circumstances would 
effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase.  “Government hardly could go on if to 
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every change 
in the general law.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see Penn 
Central, supra, at 124.
The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to regulate, subject only to the 
dictates of “ ‘justice and fairness.’ ”  Ibid.; see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).  
There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause 
becomes appropriate.  Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings.  See 
Penn Central, supra, at 123-28.  Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for 
the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic.
128
   444 U.S. 164 (1979).
129 Id. at 175.
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those elements with the character of the government action, and presented the three-part 
package as a distinct framework.  What we know today as the Penn Central three-part 
framework is really the Kaiser Aetna three-part framework.  In any event, Kaiser Aetna
merely identified those three considerations as having “particular significance”130; it did 
not represent them as definitive.
Interestingly, the first use of the Penn Central formulation as a full-fledged test 
appears to have come in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,131 in which the 
Court relied on the “character of the governmental action” to establish that direct physical 
occupations of property by the government, either directly or through authorization to 
third parties, are takings regardless of any other considerations.132 In the eyes of the 
Court, permanent physical occupations so closely resemble formal transfers of title that 
no further inquiry is necessary in order to establish a taking. Two years later, in 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,133 the Court again focused on a single factor as 
determinative – in this case finding that Monsanto had no “reasonable investment-backed 
expectations” that certain information disclosed to the Environmental Protection Agency 
would be kept confidential.134 But these cases were exceptional and revolved around 
single considerations that dominated in particular circumstances.
130 Id.
131
   458 U.S. 419 (1982).
132 See id. at 426 (“when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical 
occupation, a taking has occurred.  In such a case, ‘the character of the government action’ not only is an 
important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is determinative.”).
133
   467 U.S. 986 (1984).
134 See id. at 1005-07.
44
As late as 1986, the Court cited the Penn Central factors merely as helpful tools of 
analysis that “reinforces our belief that the imposition of withdrawal liability [under the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980] does not constitute a 
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.”135 By 1987, however, for no reason 
that is readily apparent, the Court appears to have begun treating the Penn Central
formulation as an outcome-determinative test even in circumstances in which a single 
factor is not dispositive.136  That is largely where we have stood every since and where 
we stand today.  At this moment in time, the Supreme Court appears to have settled on a 
two-track process for identifying when property has been constitutionally taken.  The first 
track concerns circumstances in which a taking will be found without elaborate inquiry 
into more than one factor.  If the government, whether permanently or temporarily, 
physically occupies an owner’s property or authorizes a third party physically to occupy 
an owner’s property, the action is a taking within the meaning of the Constitution without 
further inquiry.  Furthermore, if the government permanently denies an owner all 
economically viable use of his land, that is considered to be essentially a constructive 
occupation and is also a taking without further inquiry.137  On the other hand, regulations 
that affect possession, use, and disposition rights but that do not fall within the narrow 
per se rules for physical or economic takings are analyzed under the multiple Penn 
Central factors to determine whether the Takings Clause has been triggered.  That result 
was not foreordained by Penn Central.  It is not clear that it was even foreshadowed by it.
135
   Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
136 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606 (1987).
137 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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It does not do justice to academic criticism of Penn Central to describe such 
criticism as a cottage industry.   It is more like an industrial revolution.  More than two 
decades ago, Carol Rose characterized regulatory takings law as a “muddle,”138 and that 
characterization has acquired the status of conventional wisdom.139  Attacks on Penn 
Central, from every possible direction, would fill several very long footnotes.140  Many of 
the criticisms of modern doctrine are substantive, urging either that the Court has 
overstated141 or understated142 the extent to which regulations should be regarded as 
takings.  We do not deal with those substantive issues in this article.  For our purposes, 
we take the underlying substantive law, as it presently stands, as given and focus on Penn 
Central as a doctrinal tool.  From that perspective, the criticisms of Penn Central  that are 
relevant to our project are jurisprudential criticisms, of which there are plenty.
At the risk of oversimplifying a body of material too vast for synthesis, the 
jurisprudential criticisms of Penn Central tend to fall into two large categories.  One set 
of criticisms focuses on the inadequacy of the Penn Central factors as tools for guiding or 
predicting decisions; the factors “are too general to provide much predictability.”143  This 
138
   Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 
(1984).
139 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L.J.
203, 205 (2004) (“Conventional wisdom teaches that the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine is a muddle.”).
140
   For three relatively brief, but exemplary, footnotes, see Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence 
Between Regulatory Takings and Physical Takings, 107 Dick. L. Rev. 571, 571 n.1 (2003); Poirier, supra
note XX, at 97 n.2, Sterk, supra note XX, at 205 n.1.
141 See, e.g., Eduardo Moises Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2182 (2004);  William 
Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1151 (1997).
142 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(1985); Claeys, supra note XX.
143
   Poirier supra note XX, at 99.  For an especially forceful denunciation of the Court’s approach viewed 
as a decision-making methodology, see Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. 
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criticism is trivially true and simply requires us to keep focused on what the Penn Central
framework can and cannot do.  Obviously, the framework cannot dictate or predict 
outcomes, so people should stop trying to pretend that it can.
A second set of criticisms focuses internally on the factors themselves.  Andrea 
Peterson has observed that the Court has “defined each factor in a variety of ways, 
without acknowledging the shifts in definition.”144  For example, in employing the 
“character of the governmental action” factor, the Court has in some cases considered the 
seriousness or invasiveness of the governmental action,145 while in other cases the Court 
has instead focused on the strength of the government’s justification for its action.146
Similarly, with respect to the investment-backed expectations prong, the Court sometimes 
considers the foreseeability of the government’s action, while at other times focuses 
exclusively on whether reasonable use of the property remains.147  The Court also lacks 
consistency, it is argued, in its application of the economic impact factor.  It is unclear 
whether the crux of the Court’s inquiry focuses on the diminished value of the property 
or instead on whether the property has been denied all economically viable use.148
This set of criticisms goes to the heart of the ability of the Penn Central
framework to perform any useful doctrinal or jurisprudential function.  A framework 
Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 Urb. 
Law. 307 (1998).
144
   Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I, 77 Cal. L. Rev.
1301, 1317 (1989).
145 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 426 (1982).  See also Peterson, supra note XX, at 1317-18.
146 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
147 See Peterson, supra note 61 at 1320.
148 See id. at 1325.
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cannot guide conversation if it is so poorly defined that it does not function as a common 
frame of reference.  It is also quite different from the set of criticisms generally levelled 
at the Mathews framework.  Unlike the Mathews critics, commentators on Penn Central
seem largely unconcerned with the possibility that the Court left out important 
considerations.149  Instead, they find themselves unable to identify what precisely it is 
that the Court considers relevant to a takings inquiry and frustrated in their attempts to 
understand subsequent applications of the factors.  By contrast, commentators on 
Mathews have voiced few complaints about the meaning of the three factors in the 
Mathews framework.
This highlights an important difference in the way in which the Mathews and 
Penn Central frameworks are constructed.  The Mathews framework contains relatively 
well understood factors, with an acknowledgment (at least in Mathews itself) that other 
unnamed factors might be relevant to a due process analysis.  The framework, properly 
understood, invites consideration of factors beyond the framework itself.  The Penn 
Central framework, by contrast, looks more like a framework where the factors identified 
are exhaustive but are general and abstract, without clearly marked boundaries on what 
may be considered.  This distinction, characterized by the manner in which the Court has 
defined and limited the three factors in subsequent cases, may explain why the criticisms 
of the two frameworks have so sharply diverged.
With Mathews, courts and lawyers have little difficulty understanding and 
identifying the content of each factor.  To be sure, commentators have plenty to say about 
149 But see Treanor, supra note XX, at 1169-72 (urging the Court to focus more precisely on harm to 
individual property owners rather than on harm to the property itself without regard to the circumstances of 
its owner).
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the subjective nature of the Mathews framework and the unpredictable way that judges 
have applied the factors, but not much criticism has been leveled at the content of the 
existing factors.  Instead, Mathews’ critics, who grasp the meaning of the existing factors, 
concern themselves with identifying the factors that the Supreme Court failed to 
mention,and that lower courts have subsequently failed to consider. Penn Central’s
perceived flaw, on the other hand, is that the Court failed to inject the factors with any 
meaningful content.   With broad strokes, the Court painted a vague outline of the proper 
takings inquiry.  The court spoke of what is “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a 
substantial public interest,” “an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s use of the 
property,” action that “so frustrates” the owner’s expectations as to amount to a taking, 
and interests that are “sufficiently bound up” with reasonable expectations.  This 
language leaves the meaning of each factor up for grabs.  The breadth of the language
may explain why the Penn Central critics do not waste their breath commenting on the 
factors the Court might have excluded.  The framework itself is so loosely defined that 
judges, when deciding a takings case, appear free to include whatever considerations they 
deem relevant under the auspices of whichever factor they so choose.
If the Penn Central framework is truly susceptible to this criticism, perhaps 
Professor Echeverria is right that it serves no useful purpose and should be discarded.  If, 
however, it is possible to give meaningful content to the Penn Central framework, either 
by better understanding or by reconceptualizing what it seeks to do, the Penn Central
framework might have some useful work to do.  We think that the Penn Central
framework can be made to serve a modest function akin to the function properly served 
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by the Mathews framework.  But it requires a step backward in time and forward in 
common sense.
IV.  RECONSTRUCTING PENN CENTRAL
The factors identified as relevant to the takings inquiry by Penn Central and 
subsequent decisions are the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner, 
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.  In order to know whether 
those factors form a good basis for structuring conversations about ultimate fairness in 
the context of regulatory takings, and the extent to which the factors should be recast in 
some fashion to serve that function better, one must know to what those factors refer.
Gaining such knowledge is no easy task.   We think that it can be made a bit easier by 
focusing on the original purpose and meaning of Penn Central.
A. Three Factors in Search of Meaning and Relevance
1. Economic Impact
Justice Holmes in Mahon remarked that “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”150  The most obvious measure of how “far” regulation goes is the 
extent to which the regulation reduces the value of property.  Accordingly, one of the 
150
   260 U.S. at 415.
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factors identified by the Penn Central framework as relevant to the takings inquiry is “the 
economic impact of the regulation.”151  It is unclear, however, just how relevant this 
factor remains. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,152 the Supreme Court held 
that the deprivation of all economically viable use of land is a taking per se.153  The Court 
also acknowledged that a partial deprivation of economic value might result in a taking 
under a Penn Central analysis.154  Short of a total deprivation, however, the Court has not 
identified “a threshold of [economic] impact above which the finding of a taking would 
occur or below which the finding of a taking would be precluded.”155  Only one thing is 
certain: even very significant deprivations of economic value, without more, will fail to 
establish a taking.156  This much is clear from Penn Central, where the Court cited 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian157 for the proposition that even an 87.5 % diminution in property 
value did not require government compensation.158  Thus, while in principle diminution 
in property value can support the finding of a taking, such diminution, without more, will 
not suffice to establish a taking unless the deprivation of value is absolute.159
151 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
152
   505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
153 See id. at 1019.
154 See id. at 1019 n.8.
155 Echeverria, supra note XX, at 5.
156 See Concrete Pipe & Products, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (recognizing that “mere diminution in the 
value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking”).
157
   239 U.S. 394 (1915).
158
   438 U.S. at 131.
159
   A number of states have adopted statutes that set a threshold of value-destruction above which a taking 
is declared by law.  See Treanor, supra note XX, at 1152.
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Of course, a factor can be relevant without being decisive.  It is not at all clear, 
however, the extent to which a non-total dimunition of value is even relevant to the 
takings inquiry under modern law.  Certainly, there is no Supreme Court case to which 
one can point to establish that large but non-absolute diminutions of value play an 
important role in the takings inquiry.  Nor is it entirely clear from what perspective one is 
supposed to evaluate the economic impact, or the all-things-considered fairness, of a 
regulation.  Penn Central referred specifically to “[t]he economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant,”160 while Kaiser Aetna’s reformulation of the factors referred only the 
regulation’s impact in the abstract.161 If the loss to a particular claimant is the proper 
focus of inquiry, then the economic impact would not be measured solely by reference to 
the loss of value of the property but instead to the effect of that loss on a specific party.  
On that analysis, the status of a regulation as a taking vel non might depend on the overall 
circumstances of the claimant, including holdings that are not the subject of the 
regulation.  Indeed, if the ultimate inquiry focuses on fairness, perhaps the process by 
which value is lost is as important as the monetary extent of the loss.  Perhaps the 
relevant factor is not the economic impact of regulation on the claimant but the variance 
between that impact and the anticipated or expected impact of such regulations.  In order 
to understand what the Penn Central framework means by the ambiguous term “economic 
impact,” one must dig a bit deeper.  And that leads directly to the second Penn Central
factor.
160
   438 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added).
161 See 444 U.S. at 175.
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2. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
Penn Central clarified that the economic impact of a regulation should be 
understood in light of the regulation’s effect on “distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”162 Kaiser Aetna formulated such expectations as a distinct element of the 
analysis.  Far from clarifying the meaning of the economic impact factor, however, this 
element adds its own layer of confusion.
At one level, a focus on “investment-backed” expectations may support a reading 
of the Penn Central framework that directs attention to the circumstances of a particular 
claimant.  What you are deemed to have lost may depend on what you put into the 
property and when.  On the other hand, if one focuses on the word “reasonable” as an 
adjective to “investment-backed expectations,” a word that was added by the Kaiser 
Aetna reformulation of the framework, then perhaps the inquiry is objective rather than 
focused on any particular owner.  The problem of how one orients the Penn Central
framework is posed, but not definitively answered, by reference to investment-backed 
expectations.
At another level, one must determine what aspects of the factual and legal 
background of a regulation appropriately shape the expectations with respect to property.  
There are two aspects of that background that are of obvious potential significance: the 
principles of nuisance and property law that pre-exist the regulation and the pre-existing 
regulatory regime.
162
   438 U.S. at 138.
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a.  The Background Principles of Nuisance and Property Law
The Fifth Amendment only prohibits takings of “property” without just 
compensation.  The government cannot take something that you never had in the first 
place.  Accordingly, if a government regulation merely concretizes or reinforces 
limitations on rights that were already built into the concept of property, there can be no 
taking by definition because the property owner has not lost anything that he or she ever 
possessed.  In order to determine whether the property owner has anything about which 
to complain, one must understand the “background” laws of property, such as the law of 
nuisance, that controlled uses of the owner’s property even before the regulation took 
effect.
These background principles took center stage in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.163  South Carolina prohibited all development on coastal land owned by Lucas, 
ostensibly to preserve the State’s coastline and promote tourism.164  The Court held that if 
the action effectively destroyed all economic value of Lucas’s property, then the action 
would be considered a taking without further inquiry,165 unless an analysis of the owner’s 
property right “shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin 
with.”166  A regulation may deprive an owner of all economically viable use of land when 
those limitations “inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of 
the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land’s ownership.  A law or 
163
   505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
164
   S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250.
165 See 505 U.S. at 1019.
166 Id. at 1027.
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decree with such an effect must , in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that 
could have been achieved . . . under the State’s law of . . . nuisance . . . .”167
Background principles are thus relevant for determining investment-backed 
expectations in two ways.  First, insofar as a contemplated use of property is prohibited 
by the background principles of nuisance and property law, that contemplated use cannot 
be seen as having been within the landowner’s reasonable expectations and its prohibition 
can never rise to the level of a constitutional taking.  This much is clear from the Court’s 
discussion in Lucas of a landowner’s title and the rights it represents. Second, in 
determining the effect of background principles on the reasonable expectations of a 
property owner, courts may sometimes look to areas of law besides nuisance or property.  
A case in point is Andrus v. Allard.168  In Andrus, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
could prohibit essentially all commercial traffic in eagle feathers, even eagle feathers that 
had been acquired before the regulations took effect.  The decision implied that Congress, 
under the Commerce Clause, or a state, under its traditional police power over 
commercial dealings, may render personal property worthless insofar as the property’s 
only economic use is “sale or manufacture for sale.”169 This effectively decrees that a 
person’s “investment-backed expectations” for purposes of the Penn Central framework 
are subject to a greater “implied limitation” when dealing with the sale of commercial 
items.  The relevant “background principles” concerning the scope of property rights may 
include considerations of regulatory power, the character of the property involved, and 
167 Id. at 1029.
168
   444 U.S. 51 (1979).
169 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
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the overall “historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of 
our constitutional culture.”170
b. The Existing Regulatory Framework
The Lucas opinion discussed the nuisance exception only in the context of a 
complete deprivation of economically viable use of property.  Absent that circumstance, 
in the more ordinary case where economic value has been reduced but not eliminated, the 
expectations measured under the investment-backed expectations factor need not be 
grounded exclusively in the background principles of nuisance and property law.  Put 
another way, Lucas does not by its terms, as part of an inquiry into investment-backed 
expectations, foreclose the consideration of regulations that do not form a part of property 
law’s “background principles” in cases that do not involve total deprivations of beneficial 
use.
While the consideration of “background principles” is certainly relevant to a 
property owner’s expectations, Lucas did not rule out the consideration of regulations 
that are not themselves “background principles” of state property law as part of the 
investment-backed expectations inquiry.  One must also consider the effect on the 
reasonable expectations of property owners of existing land-use regulations that do not 
merely “duplicate the result that could have been achieved . . . under the State’s law of 
. . . nuisance . . . .”171
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1029.
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This problem of accounting for the  “existing regulatory framework” has spurred 
its own controversy, which came to a head in Palazollo v. Rhode Island.172  The takings 
claimant in that case, acting as a corporation of which he was the sole shareholder, 
acquired three undeveloped adjoining parcels.  Twelve years after the date of the 
purchase, the State of Rhode Island promulgated regulations that designated a portion of 
the claimant’s property a protected wetland.  Seven years after the effective date of those 
regulations, the claimant’s corporation was dissolved and the title to the three parcels 
passed by operation of law to the claimant as sole shareholder.173
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the claimant was precluded from 
establishing a taking under either a Lucas theory based on the deprivation of all 
economically viable use or a partial taking theory under Penn Central because he had 
acquired title to the parcels after the wetlands regulation at issue had been promulgated.  
The Rhode Island court found that the transfer of title was fatal to the Lucas claim 
because the wetlands regulation had become a part of the background principles of 
property and nuisance law for purposes of the Lucas “nuisance exception.”  Similarly, the 
court found that the transfer of title was fatal to the Penn Central claim because the 
wetlands regulation had colored the claimant’s reasonable expectations by putting him on 
notice as to the restrictions operating on the parcels at the time title was acquired.174
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.  Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy held that “a regulation that would otherwise be unconstitutional absent 
172
   533 U.S. 606 (2001).
173 Id. at 613-14.
174 See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 715-17 (R.I. 2000).
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compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s law by mere 
virtue of the passage of title.”175  Justice Kennedy reached a similar conclusion with 
regard to the Penn Central claim, finding that the claim was “not barred by the mere fact 
that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction.”176
But while this suffices to establish that notice or existence of pre-existing 
regulations does not categorically bar all future takings claims, it does not establish that 
notice or existence of pre-existing regulations is irrelevant for all takings purposes.
Justice O’Connor, in particular, wrote a concurring opinion devoted to the proposition 
that the holding in Palazzolo “does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment 
relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis.  Indeed, it 
would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it 
would be to accord it exclusive significance.”177
There is good reason to think that Justice O’Connor’s view best represents 
controlling doctrine.  For one thing, without her there was not a five-Justice majority for 
the essential holding in Palazzolo.  For another thing, the majority opinion in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency178 referred 
favorably (if abstractly) to this aspect of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo.179
And finally, the Federal Circuit has reached conclusions compatible with Justice 
175
   533 U.S. at 629-30.  Justice Kennedy explained that “[a] regulation or common-law rule cannot be a 
background principle for some owners but not for others.” Id. At 630.  Rather, “[t]he determination 
whether an existing, general law can limit all economic use of property must turn on objective factors. . . .”
Id.
176 Id. at 630.
177 Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178
   535 U.S. 302 (2002).
179 See id. at 335-36.
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O’Connor’s reasoning in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States180 and Rith Energy, 
Inc. v. United States.181 In Commonwealth Edison, the court acknowledged that “a state 
cannot defeat liability simply by showing that the current owner was aware of the 
regulatory restrictions at the time [] the property was purchased.”182  Citing Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo, however, the court reaffirmed that “the regulatory 
environment at the time of the acquisition of the property remains both relevant and 
important in judging reasonable expectations.”183  Thus, while the court did not go so far 
as to find that a previously existing regulatory restriction was dispositive of the Penn 
Central claim, it nonetheless confirmed that the Penn Central analysis would be informed 
by the takings claimant’s reasonable expectations, as colored by the existence of 
regulatory restrictions prior to the claimant’s acquisition of the land at issue.  
In Rith Energy, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the consideration of prior 
existing regulations was proper for purposes of an investment-backed expectations 
inquiry.184 Again citing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo with approval, the 
Federal Circuit found that the notice provided by a prior existing regulation remains 
relevant to the investment-backed expectations analysis, which is in turn a “long-standing 
element of regulatory takings analysis” under Penn Central.185
180 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
181 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
182 271 F.3d  at 1350 n.22.
183 Id.
184 270 F.3d at 1350.
185 Id. at 1351.
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To be sure, Justice Scalia, at least, does not believe that the regulatory background 
should count in either a total takings or a Penn Central inquiry,186 but thus far he seems to 
be a minority of one.  Accordingly, the notice provided by the presence of a pre-existing 
regulation remains one of several factors that must be considered in determining whether 
a land-use restriction has resulted in a taking under the Fifth Amendment, though 
Palazzolo makes clear that consideration of such regulations will not be determinative of 
a Penn Central claim.
3. The Character of the Governmental Action
The Court in Penn Central declared that the “character” of the government action 
was relevant to regulatory takings determinations.187  The Court then said in the next 
sentence that a “ ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property 
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises 
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”188 What did the Court have in mind by the “character” of 
the governmental action?
186
   For Justice Scalia’s views in the partial takings context, see Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[t]he ‘investment-backed expectations’ that the law will take into account do not include the 
assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be 
unconstitutional.  Which is to say that a Penn Central taking, no less than a total taking, is not absolved by 
the transfer of title.”) (citation omitted).  For his views in the total takings context, see Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
187 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
188 Id.
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One suggestion is that the Court designed the “character” factor “to refer to the 
issue of whether a regulation results in a forced physical occupation of property.”189
Perhaps this is what the Court had in mind, though this is very hard to square with the
statement in Penn Central that a taking can “more readily” be found in the case of a 
physical occupation, which certainly suggests that physical occupations do not exhaust 
the circumstances in which takings can be found .  Moreover, the Court had made clear 
well before the Penn Central decision that a permanent physical occupation of property 
was considered a categorical taking without need for further analysis.190 If the 
“character” of the governmental action is to be part of an ad hoc factual inquiry, the 
Court must have had something else in mind.
Perhaps instead the Court meant for the “character” factor to include an inquiry 
into the public interest advanced by the regulation.191 The Takings Clause, however,
presupposes that any governmental deprivation of a property interest will be made in the 
pursuit of a legitimate public purpose.192  Otherwise, not even just compensation would 
save the constitutionality of the regulation at fault for the deprivation.  Thus, the “pursuit 
of public purpose” inquiry is relevant, not to whether the government action results in a 
compensable taking, but instead to whether the government can be altogether prohibited 
from promulgating a regulation or acquiring private property.  
189 See Echeverria, supra note XX, at 5.
190 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
191 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Echeverria, supra
note XX, at 5.
192 See Hawaii v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (recognizing that “one person's property may not be 
taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though 
compensation be paid”).
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So what is left?  Only two defensible interpretations of the character factor 
remain: (1) that the “character” factor was designed to evaluate the extent to which the 
government action resembles what has been uncontroversially understood to effect a 
taking; and (2) that the “character” factor was designed to ensure that the deprivation of a 
property interest actually serves the government interests sought to be advanced.  With 
regard to the first interpretation, it makes good sense to interpret the “character” factor as 
envisioning a continuum along which government actions at one end, such as permanent 
physical occupations, would effect a taking per se because they closely resemble the 
formal exercise of the eminent domain power, which is the paradigmatic taking, whereas 
government actions at the other end, such as traditional, routine land-use regulations,
almost certainly would not effect a taking.  The more closely that a regulatory measure 
resembles a core taking, the more likely that a regulatory taking exists under the Penn 
Central framework.
With regard to the second interpretation, that the “character” factor was designed 
to ensure that the deprivation of property interests actually serve the interests sought to be 
advanced, this interpretation finds its most obvious support in the so-called “exactions” 
cases that lay out the limitations on the ability of governments to condition the grant of 
permits on the relinquishment of rights by the property owner.  As set forth in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n193 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,194 governments requiring an 
exaction in return for a needed permit “must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
193
   483 U.S. 825 (1987).
194
   512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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impact of the proposed development.”195  It also finds some support in Hodel v. Irving,196
in which the Court found “that complete abolition of both the decent and devise of a 
particular class of property” had effected a taking.197  The Court, however, did not reach 
that conclusion under a per se theory.  Rather, the Court applied the Penn Central
framework and found that “the character of the Government regulation here is
extraordinary”198 because the right to devise and descent was “abolished even in 
circumstances when the governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation of 
ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the further descent of the property.”199
B. Recapturing Penn Central
There is much ground for criticism of the Penn Central framework.  The 
framework contains factors that are not well understood or well developed.  Even if the 
only function of the framework is to structure discussion, it is questionable whether a 
framework as poorly defined as the Penn Central formulation appears to be can serve that 
function well.
We think that enough order can be brought to the chaos to allow the Penn Central
framework to serve as a vehicle for formal legal discussions of fundamental fairness.  
195 Id. at 391.  See also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 (“a use restriction may constitute a ‘taking’ if not 
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose.”).
196
   481 U.S. 704 (1987).
197 Id. at 717.
198 Id. at 716.
199 Id. at 717-18.
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The first step in the process is to recognize that the Penn Central three-factor framework 
actually started life as a two-factor framework.  It is worth recalling the central paragraph 
from Penn Central:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character of 
the governmental action.  A “taking” may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government use than when interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.200
This formulation suggests two factors at work: (1) the extent of the harm suffered by the 
property owner in view of the owner’s investment-backed expectations and (2) the 
character of the governmental action in view of the paradigmatic takings status of 
permanent physical invasions (or, perhaps even more paradigmatically, formal transfers 
of title).  The subsequent decision in Kaiser Aetna split the first factor into two separate 
elements, but that was probably a step in the wrong direction.  It is not clear what it 
means to look at investment-backed expectations divorced from the overall economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant (or vice versa), and case law subsequent to 
Kaiser Aetna does not stand as a testament to the wisdom of Kaiser Aetna’s innovation.
Instead, a dual focus on the harm to the claimant and the nature of the governmental 
action provide a basis for considering any matters that are plausibly relevant to an overall 
determination of the fairness of making a property owner bear the burden of a 
governmental regulation.
Put simply, we believe that much of the confusion concerning the meaning of the 
Penn Central framework has come from the unwise decision in Kaiser Aetna to separate 
200
   438 U.S. at 124.
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the effect of the challenged regulation on the claimant from the claimant’s investment-
backed expectations.  The result has been to render the economic effect on the claimant 
essentially irrelevant in all but the most extreme cases of total deprivation of beneficial 
use.  It is hard to see any room in the existing doctrinal discussions for loss of value short 
of absolute loss, and that makes little sense if one is truly concerned about overall 
fairness.  Instead, focus has shifted almost entirely to the element of investment-backed 
expectations, with chaos the predictable result until and unless a consensus can be 
reached – and none seems in view – about whether the proper focus of attention is the 
individual property owner or the property in the abstract.  By returning to the original 
Penn Central formulation, attention will be re-centered on the actual impact of the 
regulation, with the owner’s expectations serving a qualifying function in that analysis.
We do not purport here to prescribe how that analysis should proceed.  Is the 
doctrinally (or normatively) proper focus of inquiry on a particular property owner who is 
affected by governmental action or on the subject property in the abstract?  In the first 
case, one might want to pay attention to the property owner’s overall financial position 
and/or pay close attention to the state of the regulatory world when the owner acquired 
the property.  In the second case, by contrast, where focus is on the affected property with 
regard to the contingencies of ownership, there is less cause for considering these 
particulars.  We do not seek to resolve this dispute.  Our point here is only that the Penn 
Central formulation, as originally constructed in Penn Central, provides a doctrinal 
vehicle through which these issues can be raised and debated and calls for consideration 
of matters that seem appropriate to an inquiry into fairness.
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A second step in the process of clarifying the appropriate role of the Penn Central
framework is to understand the domain in which it operates.  There are certain 
governmental actions (other than direct title transfers) that the Court deems to be takings 
without further inquiry.  These include permanent physical occupations and complete 
destruction of economic value of property.  In these cases, according to the Court, no 
complex, multi-faceted arguments about fairness need to be constructed because the 
outcome of the inquiry is foreordained.  The scope of this doctrine can best be grasped if 
one characterizes takings claims as either total or partial takings.  The concept of total
takings is sometimes conflated with the less inclusive category of physical takings, 
perhaps because physical takings have historically been the most common form of total 
takings.  But a total taking, in its broadest sense, occurs whenever a government action or 
regulation fully deprives the claimant of a fundamental property interest.
It is conventional wisdom among property scholars that there is no set of rights 
that fundamentally must be part of the concept of property.  The dominant understanding 
is instead that property is, quite simply, a bundle of rights protected by the state and that 
any bundles put together by the state are equally deserving of the label “property” – if 
indeed the label “property” serves any useful analytic function whatsoever.201  A 
competing vision, however, maintains that there are certain basic features of property that 
form a cohesive, coherent core of the fundamental idea of property: the rights to possess, 
use, and dispose.202  We do not intend here to plunge into this age-old dispute.203  It is 
201
   For the classic expression of this position, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in
XXII Nomos 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
202 See Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 2 (1990)
203
   The dispute may well reduce to the question whether property is pre-political or post-political, which 
goes back at least to Blackstone (pre-political) and Bentham (post-political), but that is a topic for another 
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enough for our purposes to observe that the rights to possess, use, and dispose of property 
seem to play a central role in the law of regulatory takings.  A total deprivation of any 
one of these three basic rights is enough to constitute a taking without further inquiry.  
Partial deprivations of these rights call forth the multi-faceted Penn Central framework.
Thus, in Loretto, the Court found a taking without elaborate analysis where a regulation 
totally deprived the plaintiff of the right exclusively to possess her land. 204  In Lucas, the 
Court found a taking without elaborate analysis where the regulation at issue totally 
deprived the plaintiff of the right to use his land in any economically meaningful sense of 
the term “use.”205  No case of which we are aware has yet involved a total deprivation of 
the right to dispose of property, but Hodel v. Irving,206 which found a taking when the 
government deprived Native Americans of the right to pass property by will, suggests 
that a stronger interference with the right to dispose would likely constitute a taking per 
se.
These rules concerning per se takings fit elegantly into the Penn Central
framework.  If the impact on the claimant is the complete loss of one of the three bedrock 
characteristics of property, that impact, economic or otherwise, is so overwhelming that 
other considerations are simply swamped.  In other words, there are certain impacts on 
private property owners that are so conceptually large that they constitute a taking 
day.  Professor Lawson, however, wishes gratuitously to express his disagreement with the conventional 
wisdom and his agreement with the Blackstone/Epstein position on this point.  
204 See 458 U.S. at 435-36.
205 See 505 U.S. at 1015-18.  David Lucas, of course, was permitted to “use” his land in a sense even 
under the strictest regulations imposed by South Carolina: he could walk on it, look at it, admire the 
wildlife, etc.  But a complete or near-complete loss of economic value is a reasonable proxy for a complete 
or near-complete right to use the property, as the concept of “use” would be understood by most ordinary 
landowners.
206
   481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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without further inquiry. 207 To be sure, the Court in Loretto seemed to find a taking per 
se, not because of the nature of the impact on the claimant, but because of the character 
of the government action – namely, that a permanent physical occupation looked very 
much like a transfer of title.  But a better way to understand the concerns voiced by the 
Court in Loretto is to identify them as an especially severe impact on the claimant’s right 
to possession rather than as a function of the kind of governmental action at issue.
That leads to the third step in a clarification of the Penn Central framework.  As 
Loretto demonstrates, there is considerable confusion about the significance of the 
character of the governmental action.  We suspect, however, that critics of Penn Central
may be making the situation seem worse than it is.  In cases that involve partial rather 
than total takings of a fundamental property interest, it appears to us to be self-evidently 
relevant to a fairness inquiry whether the government is doing something that looks very 
much like an exercise of eminent domain under some other guise or is instead simply 
doing things that governments have long done without much question.  It is also at least 
arguably relevant to a fairness inquiry whether the government is actually achieving 
anything of substance by imposing burdens on property owners: a large, badly-crafted 
burden seems less fair than a small, well-tailored one.  If fairness is the goal, the Penn 
207
  Of course, in order to determine whether the totality of a feature of property has been abrogated, one 
has to define the contours of that feature.  This raises the well-known “denominator problem”: when 
assessing the extent of the impact of a government regulation, what is the baseline ownership interest 
against which the impact should be measured?  If a regulation deprives a landowner of all of the use of air 
rights above a certain level, is that a total taking of use rights, or does one measure the loss by reference to 
the rights of the landowner in the entire parcel of land, including surface and sub-surface rights (or perhaps 
even against the rights of the landowner in all property that he or she owns, even if that property is not the 
direct subject of the challenged regulation)?  This problem has bedeviled the Court, See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1016 n.7. and we offer no solution to it here.  The Penn Central framework raises the problem, provides a 
vehicle for its exploration, and accommodates any reasonable answer that one could provide.  Frameworks 
are not supposed to do much more than that.
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Central formulation seems reasonably capable of capturing and channeling arguments in 
that direction.
V.  CONCLUSION
We do not maintain that even the most clearly articulated Penn Central
framework will render the law of regulatory takings clear, or even comprehensible.  It 
may well be that the entire enterprise is doomed to failure because there simply is no line 
to be drawn between formal exercises of eminent domain on the one hand and all 
regulations that affect economic value on the other.  But American law has chosen to 
tread a middle ground for nearly one-and-one-half centuries.  If one takes that choice as a 
jurisprudential given, and if all that one expects a framework to do in this context is to 
raise issues rather than resolve them (or predict outcomes, or tell courts how to reach 
those outcomes), a properly understood Penn Central framework does not fare so badly.
For many of the same reasons, the analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge holds up under 
scrutiny better than many scholars credit.  Penn Central and Mathews v. Eldridge deserve 
another look before they are taken out with yesterday’s garbage.
